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pAbstract
In response to the 2007–09 “Great Recession,” the maximum duration of U.S.
unemployment benefits was increased from the normal level of 26 weeks to an
unprecedented 99 weeks. I estimate the impact of these extensions on job search,
comparing them with the more limited extensions associated with the milder 2001
recession. The analyses rely on monthly matched microdata from the Current
Population Survey. I find that a 10-week extension of UI benefits raises unemployment
duration by about 1.5 weeks, with little variation across the two episodes. This estimate
lies in the middle-to-upper end of the range of past estimates.
JEL codes: J64; J65
Keywords: Unemployment benefits; Job search1 Introduction
During the recent “Great Recession” and its aftermath, unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits in the United States were extended from the normal period of 26 weeks to the
historically unprecedented maximum of 99 weeks. Rather than being rolled out com-
prehensively, the extensions were phased in slowly over time, and their full extent and
exact timing varied across states based on state unemployment rates and other factors.
This complex rollout created idiosyncratic variation in the maximum availability of UI
benefits and hence provides a unique opportunity for assessing the effects of UI benefit
extensions on job search behavior and unemployment duration.
Other recent research has examined the impact of the benefit extensions and found
modest effects on search behavior and the overall unemployment rate but a larger ef-
fect on the share of unemployment that is long term (Rothstein 2011, Farber and
Valletta 2013). Consistent with recent research using data for other countries (Card
et al. 2007), the main estimated impact of the recent U.S. benefit extensions was pro-
longed labor force attachment rather than reduced job finding.
I add to the existing literature by providing new estimates of the impact of recent
benefit extensions on search behavior and unemployment duration. Like Rothstein
(2011) and Farber and Valletta (2013), I use matched data from consecutive months of
the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS). These data are combined with data on the
monthly timing of UI extensions at the state level. The resulting data set is used for aValletta; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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role of variation in the maximum availability of UI benefits across states and over time.
The paper makes three main contributions relative to the existing literature.
First, I estimate the response of unemployment duration to benefit duration and
directly compare results for the recent benefit extensions with past estimates based on
U.S. administrative data (Moffitt 1985; Katz and Meyer 1990; Card and Levine 2000;
Jurajda and Tannery 2003). The findings suggest that the CPS household survey data
provide a useful substitute for UI administrative data, which typically are available with
a substantial lag (and are not yet generally available for the recent UI extension period).
Second, I compare the most recent episode of benefit extensions with the prior epi-
sode that occurred during a period of relatively favorable labor market conditions in
the early 2000s. This enables an assessment of whether search responses vary based on
the state of the labor market. Farber and Valletta (2013) focused on the duration of
benefits rather than their generosity and found no meaningful difference in their job
search impact under the very different labor market conditions prevailing during the
benefit extension episodes of 2002–04 and 2008–12. However, they used a restricted
specification that does not enable direct estimation of the response of unemployment
duration to benefit duration.
Finally, I also compare the impact of the UI extensions on search behavior and out-
comes for individuals who are eligible or ineligible to receive UI benefits. Individuals
who are ineligible to receive UI benefits will not be directly affected by the availability
of extended benefits and as such can in principle be used as a “placebo” group. How-
ever, the ineligible group may be affected by spillover effects or search externalities that
increase their job-finding rates (Levine 1993; Lalive et al. 2013). Recent research sug-
gests that such spillover effects are likely to be most pronounced when available jobs
are rationed due to a severe downturn, such as that associated with the recent recession
(Landais et al. 2010). My comparison of extended UI effects for eligible and ineligible
individuals provides a test for search externalities that result from the implementation
of broad labor market programs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the UI extension programs and
relevant past research, along with further discussion of the value-added of my paper.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the matched CPS data and econometric framework, followed
by the empirical results in Section 5. To preview, my results show that for the group
most likely to be affected by UI extensions (job losers unemployed for at least 6
months), the estimated search response is in the middle-to-upper end of the range of
past estimates based on administrative data. The estimates do not vary meaningfully
across the two separate episodes analyzed (2000–04 and 2007–11). However, I uncover
evidence of spillover effects that raise job-finding rates for ineligible individuals in states
with high unemployment rates in the 2007–11 sample. I provide interpretation and dis-
cussion of these findings in the conclusion and suggest avenues for future research.
2 UI extensions and job search
2.1 Normal and extended UI benefits in the United States
UI benefits typically are available for 26 weeks in the United States under the joint
federal-state Unemployment Compensation program established under the Social
Security Act of 1935. About 95 percent of payroll employees are in jobs that are
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lost a job through no fault of their own (typically a permanent or temporary layoff ) and
they meet state-specific minimum requirements regarding work history and wages dur-
ing the 12 to 15 month period preceding job loss. Availability for work and active job
search are required for ongoing receipt of UI benefits, although the exact rules vary
across states.
Normal UI benefits periodically are extended during episodes of economic distress,
through a combination of permanent and temporary legislation. Table 1 lists the rele-
vant programs for my analyses, their key provisions, and a timeline for the programs’





Extended Benefits (EB)2 1970-Mar. 1993
Mar. 1993-forward
13 (IUR ≥ 5%)
13 (IUR ≥ 5% or 6%, or TUR ≥ 6.5%)




TEUC 13 (all states)




Jul. 6, 2008 - Nov. 22, 2008 13 (all states)
Nov. 23, 2008-Nov. 7, 2009
Tier I 20 (all states)
Tier II 13 (IUR ≥ % or TUR ≥ 8%)
Combined total 33
Nov. 8, 2009-May 26, 2012
Tier I 20 (all states)
Tier II 14 (all states)
Tier III 13 (TUR ≥ 6% or IUR ≥ 4%)
Tier IV 6 (TUR ≥ 8.5% or IUR ≥ 6%)3
Combined total 53
May 27, 2012-Sep. 1, 2012
Tier I 20 (all states)
Tier II 14 (TUR ≥ 6%)
Tier III 13 (TUR ≥ 7% or IUR ≥ 4%)
Tier IV 6 (TUR ≥ 9% or IUR ≥ 6%)
Combined total 53
Sep. 2, 2012-Dec. 28, 2013
Tier I 14 (all states)
Tier II 14 (TUR ≥ 6%)
Tier III 9 (TUR ≥ 7% or IUR ≥ 4%)
Tier IV 10 (TUR ≥ 9% or IUR ≥ 6%)
Combined total 47
1States-specific triggers are based on the Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) or Total Unemployment Rate (TUR) and generally
include “look back” provisions (comparison of the rate used for the trigger to its rate over the prior 2–3 years). See text.
2Optional state triggers for EB program indicated. Up to 1981, the EB program included a national IUR trigger.
3From Feb. 19 through May 26, 2012, Tier IV allowed for 16 weeks if the state was not triggered on EB.
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that determine the state-time variation used in my analysis.1
The Federal-State Extended Benefits (EB) program, permanently authorized begin-
ning in 1970, originally provided up to 13 weeks of additional UI benefits in states with
high unemployment rates. It was amended in 1993 to allow for up to 20 weeks of add-
itional benefits in states with especially high unemployment rates. The EB thresholds
or triggers are based on the state’s Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) or Total Un-
employment Rate (TUR), combined with the change over time (“lookback” provisions).2
States are allowed some latitude to choose different triggers based on the IUR or TUR.
In recent years the triggers generally have been based on a TUR of 6.5 percent for a
13-week extension or 8.0 percent for 20 weeks, combined with a 10-percent increase in
the TUR over the previous two years. Due to concerns that this lookback provision
would cause some states to trigger off EB despite very high, sustained unemployment
rates in recent years, it was modified in 2010 to allow states to rely on a three-year
lookback period.
The EB program has been supplemented by temporary programs that have been used
eight times since 1958, with the most recent episode beginning in 2008. Data on the
timing of extensions at the state level are not available for the UI extension episodes
prior to 2002. I therefore focus on the two episodes of UI extensions since 2002.
In response to the recession of 2001 and subsequent slow labor market recovery, the
U.S. Congress passed the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation (TEUC)
legislation, which was effective from March 2002 through early 2004. As shown in
Table 1, this law extended UI availability by 13 weeks in all states and an additional 13
weeks in “high unemployment” states. The latter are defined based on an IUR of at
least 4 percent and a lookback requirement specifying a 20-percent increase over the
prior two years. Between normal UI benefits (26 weeks) and the EB and TEUC pro-
grams, a maximum of 72 weeks of UI benefit duration was available during this period.
However, that maximum was reached in only a small number of states and therefore
applied only to a limited number of individuals.
The severity of job loss and persistent labor market weakness during and after the re-
cession of 2007–09 resulted in an unprecedented expansion of UI benefit availability.
Between mid-2008 and late 2009, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC)
program was slowly phased in. It initially provided for 13 additional weeks of benefits
in July 2008. As listed in Table 1, additional benefit tiers (based on trigger thresholds)
were added in December 2008 and November 2009. From that latter date until late
2012, the combined benefits availability through four EUC tiers remained at 53 weeks.
In conjunction with normal UI benefit durations of 26 weeks and a maximum of 20
weeks through the EB program, the maximum duration of available UI benefits during
this EUC program peak was 99 weeks. Table 1 also lists the subsequent legislative
changes that raised the unemployment trigger thresholds in May 2012 and scaled back
maximum EUC durations slightly in September (through changes in three of the four
tiers). These provisions remained in place through the termination of the program at
the end of 2013.
Information on maximum available UI duration through the EB and EUC programs
for each state was released weekly by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). I used these
weekly releases to construct a panel of UI availability for each state at a monthly
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cover the last two periods of UI extensions.3 I focus on a measure of the maximum
number of weeks that an eligible individual can receive in a particular state and month,
labeled as the “potential benefit duration,” or PBD (following Marinescu 2013). Vari-
ation in the PBD will be used as the measure of extended UI availability in the analyses
below.
Figure 1 illustrates the variation in PBD over time (years 2000-late 2013) based on
the various programs in effect. Panel A displays the maximum and minimum PBD
measured across states in each sample month, and Panel B displays the average and
standard deviation of the PBD across unemployed individuals (measured using a sam-
ple of all individuals identified as unemployed and eligible to receive UI in the CPS
microdata; see the definition of eligibility in Section 3.2).4 Most states provide 26 weeks
of UI during non-extension periods, although Massachusetts provides 30 and Montana
provides 28 (hence the maximum exceeds 26 during non-extension periods).
Panel A shows that the PBD maximum/minimum spread across states was quite large
(around 30–40 weeks) in the most recent extension episode and the preceding episode





















































Figure 1 Variation in total weeks of UI available (Jan. 2000 through Aug. 2013). A. Maximum and
minimum (across states) and B. Mean and Standard Deviation (weighted). Note: Author's calculations from U.S.
Department of Labor data (see text). Panel B series calculated using CPS weighted unemployment observations.
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the preceding episode. This is reflected in Panel B, which shows that the average weeks
of total UI eligibility reached about 96 in late 2009, implying that the typical un-
employed individual was located in a state in which maximum UI eligibility was 99
weeks. In the early 2000s, maximum weeks of eligibility reached 72. However, few
states triggered on to the maximum extensions, and only about 13 additional weeks of
UI beyond the normal 26 were available to the typical unemployed individual. The
standard deviation displayed in Panel B indicates that the dispersion in total weeks
available was only slightly higher in the recent episode than in the preceding one, im-
plying that there is a similar degree of cross-state variation that can be used for esti-
mates in both episodes. Panel B also shows a sharp drop in 2012 in the average PBD.
This sharp drop occurred as unemployment rates dropped below the thresholds re-
quired for program continuation and some states reduced their normal UI duration
below the prior low of 26 weeks.5
For the empirical analyses in subsequent sections, I use the extended UI data (and
matched CPS data) through 2011 only. This choice is based on measurement issues
that distort the estimated impact of the post-2011 reductions in PBD. The measure-
ment issues reflect a fundamental asymmetry in the implementation of PBD changes
caused by the state unemployment rate crossing a trigger threshold. An expansion
causes an immediate increase in PBD for all eligible individuals, hence the timing and
extent of the expansions is precisely measured. By contrast, when PBD is reduced in a
state, individuals currently receiving benefits under the triggered-off program typically
can continue to receive the full allotment of benefit weeks for which they qualified
prior to the reduction in PBD. This allows them to continue receiving benefits for up
to 20 weeks (4 to 5 months) after the rollback, which is the maximum number of weeks
available through the EB program or the separate EUC tiers. As such, reductions in
maximum weeks available provide very imprecise information about the timing of
changes in PBD for affected individuals in a state, particularly in the context of the
monthly frequency data that I use. The estimates for the post-2011 sample are domi-
nated by the resulting measurement error (biased toward zero) and hence are excluded
from my analyses.
2.2 UI extension effects on unemployment duration
Much of the existing research that assesses the impacts of unemployment benefits on
search behavior focuses on benefit generosity (weekly/monthly payment amounts),
which follows directly from the underlying theory of optimal UI (e.g. Baily 1978, Chetty
2008). However, a number of papers have directly examined the search response to U.S.
benefit extensions and found that an increase in the maximum duration of benefits leads
to an increase in average UI spell durations (notably Moffitt 1985, Katz and Meyer 1990,
Card and Levine 2000, Jurajda and Tannery 2003, Schwartz 2013).6
More recently, researchers have turned their attention to the question of optimal
benefit duration and whether it varies based on the business cycle or local economic
conditions. In the classic formulation and extensions, optimal benefit generosity reflects
a tradeoff between the welfare gains arising from insurance against income loss versus
the disincentive or moral hazard effects of UI benefits on job search (Baily 1978, Chetty
2008). Recent research suggests that this tradeoff may depend on labor market
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labor market conditions that limit the moral hazard effect on job search. Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2011) find direct empirical support for such effects based on joint
variation in benefit generosity and state labor market conditions. Alternatively, if jobs are
rationed when labor market conditions are weak, the resulting search externalities imply
that the effects of increased program generosity will be smaller at the aggregate (“macro”)
level than is implied by the direct individual (“micro”) responses (Landais et al. 2010).
This gap between micro and macro estimates is likely to take the form of spillovers to
individuals who are not eligible for the program expansion (Levine 1993, Lalive et al.
2013).
Direct empirical tests have yielded little or no support for variation in the effects of
benefit extensions based on labor market conditions. Schmieder et al. (2012) used
German data and found small effects of benefit extensions on unemployment duration,
with limited variation in their behavioral impacts over the business cycle. Using U.S.
data, Jurajda and Tannery (2003) found no variation in UI duration effects across two
local labor markets with very different labor market conditions. Similarly, Farber and
Valletta (2013) found no difference in UI extension effects on unemployment duration
across the two episodes associated with the relatively mild recession of the early 2000s
and the more severe recent recession.
Past papers on the effects of benefit extensions generally have relied on administra-
tive data on UI recipients. These data sets provide limited information on recipients’
post-UI experiences and unemployment (e.g., whether they exit through job finding,
continue searching, or withdraw from the labor force). In addition, the empirical focus
on UI recipients in administrative data precludes analyses of indirect or spillover effects
on UI nonrecipients and ineligibles. The use of survey data such as the CPS enables
analyses along both dimensions. In the empirical work below, I examine how the un-
employment experience of likely UI recipients responds to variation in the duration of
UI benefits. I also test for search externalities by comparing outcomes for UI eligible
and ineligible individuals across the extension episodes associated with the relatively
mild recession of the early 2000s and the more severe recent recession. Relative to Far-
ber and Valletta (2013), I use a less restrictive specification that enables direct estima-
tion of the response of unemployment duration to benefit duration and direct
comparison to prior findings.
3 CPS matched transitions data
3.1 Matching and adjustments
To analyze transitions out of unemployment and link them to changes in UI availabil-
ity, I use matched monthly data on individual labor force participants from the U.S.
CPS. The CPS is the monthly household survey that forms the basis for official U.S.
labor force statistics, such as the unemployment rate. The pre-match sample is re-
stricted to unemployed individuals age 16 and over during all months of the years
2000–04 and 2007–11. These correspond to the periods of labor market weakness and
associated activation of extended benefits, as displayed earlier in Figure 1 (with about
12 months of pre-recession data included in each case, for normalization purposes).7
Due to the rotating sampling scheme used for the CPS, surveyed households and in-
dividuals are in the sample for two separate periods of 4 consecutive months (with an
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matching for about three-fourths of the sample (all but the “outgoing rotation groups”
that are exiting the sample for eight months or permanently). The monthly match is
based on household identifiers and validated by ensuring that the reported data on age,
education, race, and gender do not conflict across matched observations.
I identify labor market transitions by comparing an individual’s labor force status in
month t to that in month t+1. The data on UI benefits is matched based on the state’s
UI extension status as of the 5th day of month t+1. Because the survey reference week
is defined to always include the 12th day of the month, the 5th is the day immediately
preceding the earliest possible day of the reference week.8 This ensures that any
changes in PBD that could affect the individual’s transition status between months t
and t+1 are incorporated. All other variables are measured at the time of the base tran-
sition month (month t).
A well-known concern regarding matched CPS data is the likelihood of spurious
transitions in labor force status arising from inconsistent or error-ridden survey re-
sponses rather than meaningful changes (Abowd and Zellner 1985; Poterba and
Summers 1986, 1995). Such spurious transitions could impart a downward bias to the
estimated effect of UI extensions on unemployment exits and might also reduce the
precision of the estimates. I therefore follow past research by adjusting the data to
minimize the incidence of spurious transitions (Rothstein 2011, Farber and Valletta
2013). In particular, for individuals identified as leaving unemployment one month, either
through job finding or labor force exit, and then returning to unemployment the next
month, their records are recoded to show no transition (and the newly created observa-
tions are retained). This correction requires restriction of the final analysis sample to
individuals who are observed to be in their first or second month of a consecutive four-
month span in the sample. I refer to these below as “two-month forward matches”.
To illustrate the impact of this correction on the measured transitions, Figure 2 dis-
































Figure 2 Unemployment survivor curves, 2007-11 sample. Note: Author's calculations from matched
CPS data (weighted).
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ple. The correction raises measured durations. The corrected data show that about 15
percent of unemployment spells last at least 6 months, approximately double the share
reaching 6 months duration based on the unadjusted data.9 The correction brings the
share of long-term unemployment closer to the corresponding share reported in the
CPS cross-section data.10 The corrected transitions will be used for my main analyses,
although I will also provide a comparison to results based on the larger sample of un-
corrected transitions.
3.2 Distinguishing UI eligibility
An appropriate sample for analysis of the effect of UI benefits is a sample of un-
employed individuals who are eligible to receive UI. However, because no direct infor-
mation on receipt of UI benefits is available in the monthly CPS data, I rely on a proxy
measure based on the reported reason for unemployment. Unemployed individuals
who report job loss as the reason for unemployment are in principle eligible to receive
UI, while those who report a voluntary separation or labor force entry (new or re-
entry) are in principle ineligible. I rely on this distinction below for the identification of
UI eligible individuals and a placebo sample of ineligibles.
Past research shows that this distinction corresponds well to actual patterns of UI re-
cipiency, although it is imperfect (Rothstein 2011, Farber and Valletta 2013). A worker
who reports a job loss may not have sufficient prior employment experience to qualify
for unemployment insurance or may have been fired for cause. In addition, an eligible
worker may choose not to apply for benefits. These potential problems are mitigated
somewhat by my empirical focus on job losers who have been unemployed for at least
6 months, since UI take-up among job losers generally increases with unemployment
duration. More generally, my estimates should be interpreted as the effects of UI exten-
sions on a sample of individuals who are potentially affected by the extensions. To the
extent that misclassification exists for my samples of eligibles and ineligibles, my results
for both groups may be biased toward zero.
3.3 Descriptive statistics for the UI eligible/ineligible samples
The basic characteristics of the matched CPS data extract to be used in the economet-
ric analyses are displayed in Table 2. For the two separate analysis periods of 2000–04
and 2007–11, the sample is divided into UI eligible and ineligible individuals.
The top portion of Table 2 illustrates the construction of the analysis samples of
matched observations from the initial complete samples of unemployed individuals in
the monthly CPS surveys.11 The complete set of restrictions, including two-month for-
ward matches and elimination of observations with missing values, leaves about 40 per-
cent of the original sample of unemployed individuals. This pattern is consistent across
the two sub-periods and also for UI eligible and ineligible individuals.
Table 2 shows that exit rates from unemployment are lower in the recent sample
period than in the earlier sample period, as expected given that labor market conditions
were more favorable in the earlier period.12 In both sample periods, exit rates generally
are lower for UI eligible individuals (job losers) than for ineligibles (job leavers and
labor force entrants). The difference is primarily due to exits out of the labor force ra-
ther than exits to employment. The substantial movements in and out of the labor
Table 2 CPS matched sample formation and descriptive statistics













Currently unemployed 173,391 123,276 107,327 102,417
Valid matches1 115,479 82,014 70,630 67,639
Matched two months forward 73,022 51,818 43,546 42,210
Final analysis samples
(recoded transitions, dropped missings)2
72,347 50,141 43,167 40,129
Exit rates from unemployment
Total exit rate 0.253 0.362 0.336 0.445
Exit to employment 0166 0.143 0.235 0.216
Exit to not in the labor force 0.087 0.219 0.101 0.229
Unemployment duration >= 26 weeks
Total exit rate 0.171 0.282 0.241 0.343
Exit to employment 0.078 0.086 0.125 0.119
Exit to not in the labor force 0.093 0.196 0.116 0.223
Unemployment duration
Average 28.2 27.4 16.7 16.6
Share unemployment duration >= 26 weeks 0.402 0.377 0.225 0.215
Share newly unemployed (<5 weeks) 0.231 0.250 0.346 0.383
State variables (means)
Potential duration of Ul benefits (PBD) 74.2 69.4 33.0 32.2
Unemployment rate (percent) 8.7 8.2 5.5 5.4
Δln (payroll emp.), 3-month annualized −0.010 −0.007 0.001 0.003
Notes:
1Matched identification from month t to t+1, including id variables and consistent gender, race, age, and educational
attainment.
2Dropped observations with missing values (or weights equal to zero) and allocated labor force or unemployment
duration values. Selected transitions recoded as described in the text.
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this group.13
Table 2 also shows that despite substantially higher exit rates for UI ineligibles, aver-
age reported duration is nearly the same for both groups. This likely reflects the re-
cently documented tendency for labor force re-entrants to report unemployment
durations upon re-entry that substantially exceed one month (Elsby et al. 2011). Such
misreporting of unemployment duration is unlikely to affect the econometric analyses
below, for two reasons: (i) in my analyses, reported duration is used only as a control
variable and for coarse sample breaks rather than precise measurement of the timing of
UI receipt and exhaustion; (ii) receipt of UI benefits is not restricted to self-reported
unemployment spells but instead applies to prolonged periods of non-employment as
well (Rothstein and Valletta 2014). The table also shows that state labor market condi-
tions are slightly more adverse and available UI weeks are slightly longer for eligible
than for ineligible individuals in the later sample period, which reflects the preponder-
ance of job losers in states that were hit hardest by the recession.
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is provided in Additional file 1: Table A1. In each period, the sample of ineligibles is
younger and less educated, with a higher proportion of women. These differences in
characteristics are as expected, given that the ineligible sample is dominated by labor
force entrants. Finally, eligibles are more likely to be affiliated with cyclically sensitive
sectors such as construction and durable manufacturing, while ineligibles are more
concentrated in industry sectors that are characterized by tenuous employment attach-
ment even during cyclical upturns, such as the retail and personal services sectors.14
On net, these descriptive statistics are broadly consistent with the delineation of the
sample into UI eligible and ineligible groups.
Figures 3 and 4 provide more detail on unemployment exit rates, displaying them
across the samples and by UI eligibility, broken down by unemployment duration (mea-
sured in months).
Figure 3 displays exit rates for the complete sample (eligibles and ineligibles together)
in the two separate periods. It shows that overall exit rates were higher in the earlier
sample period across all durations, with a noticeable uptick in exits at durations beyond
20 months in both samples. The gap in exit rates also widens somewhat beyond 6
months. To the extent that extended UI availability reduces exit rates, the widening
gap in overall exit rates at higher durations may reflect the broader availability of ex-
tended UI benefits in the recent period, which reduced exit rates for the long-term un-
employed in that period versus the earlier period.
Figure 4 separates the exit rate plots by sample period in the separate panels, and by
UI eligibility status within each panel. Exit rates are generally higher for the ineligibles
versus eligibles across all durations. The notable exception is at the longest durations
(21 months or longer) in the 2007–11 sample, for which exit rates for eligibles and inel-
igibles are similar. Since benefit availability was extended up to 23 months in this
period, the relative increase in exit rates at long durations for UI eligibles may reflect

































2007-11 and 2000-04 Samples
Figure 3 Unemployment exit rates 2007–11 and 2000–04 samples. Note: Author's calculations from








































































Figure 4 Unemployment exit rates, by sample and UI eligibility. A. 2007-11 sample and B. 2000-04
sample. Note: Author's calculations from matched CPS data (weighted). Transitions adjusted as described in
the text. Values smoothed across adjacent duration bins. Durations for UI ineligibles in 2000-04 censored at
20 months (due to sparse data).
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tended UI benefits would have been exhausted well before 21 months in that period
(the PBD was 72 weeks or about 17 months during this period).
The exit rate plots are mildly suggestive of extended benefit effects on unemployment
exit rates. The next section lays out a discrete time hazard framework for testing these
effects more formally.
4 Econometric framework
My econometric analysis of extended UI effects on job search behavior and outcomes
is based on a discrete time framework for the estimation of the probability of exiting
unemployment. I estimate equations of the following form:
Pr Y ist ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ δ⋅ PBDst=10ð Þ þ ωs þ ψt þ βXist þ f Dist ; γð Þ þ λZst ð1Þ
The dependent variable Y is an indicator for whether an individual i living in state swho is unemployed in the survey reference week in month t exits unemployment by
month t+1 (i.e., reports no longer being unemployed in the reference week in the
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finding or labor force withdrawal. Estimation is based on the monthly panel of individ-
uals formed by the CPS match. This is a standard “grouped duration data” approach
that enables straightforward incorporation of my key time-varying covariates plus a
flexible baseline hazard (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002, section 20.4). Below, I focus primar-
ily on specifications that do not distinguish the exit route, although I also provide
multinomial logit estimates based on the separate routes.
The main coefficient of interest is δ, which measures the effect on unemployment
exits of 10 additional weeks of extended UI benefits (potential benefit duration, or
PBD), which varies across states and over time. Because the UI benefit extensions are
most relevant for individuals who have been unemployed for at least 26 weeks, I follow
Rothstein (2011) below in estimating additional specifications that allow the effects of
PBD to vary across groups defined by whether they have been unemployed for at least
26 weeks.
The most basic specification estimated below incorporates a complete set of state
dummies (ωs) and date dummies (ψt; one for each of the 60 months observed in the
sample, less one). The state dummies account for differences in labor market condi-
tions that are constant over time within states, while the date dummies account for
changes in labor market conditions that are uniform across states.15
Subsequent specifications reported below add vectors of individual characteristics
(X), individual unemployment duration (D), and state labor market characteristics (Z).
The vector X is relatively standard and includes education (4 categories), age (7 cat-
egories), gender, marital status, the interaction of gender and marital status, an indica-
tor for nonwhite race, and industry dummies (14 categories).16 D is individual
unemployment duration, which is incorporated based on the nonlinear function f; fol-
lowing Rothstein (2011), it includes terms for duration in weeks, its square, its inverse,
and an indicator for newly unemployed individuals (duration <5 weeks). Finally, and
most important, my final and preferred specification includes monthly measures of
conditions in the state labor market, in particular cubics in the contemporaneous state
unemployment rate and the rate of payroll employment growth (measured over the 3
months ending in the observation month, at an annual rate). Because the availability of
extended UI benefits reflects state-specific labor market conditions, primarily the un-
employment rate, inclusion of these variables is critical to ensure that the estimates are
not contaminated by the direct correlation between UI extensions and deterioration in
state labor market conditions. In all of the regressions, the standard errors are clustered
by state.
Because the regressions include complete state and time (month) dummies, identifi-
cation of the key parameter δ relies on differences in maximum available UI benefits
(PBD) across states and over time, conditional on individual characteristics and state
labor market conditions. The complexity of the extended UI trigger rules causes idio-
syncratic and plausibly exogenous PBD variation across states and over time. It is com-
mon over my sample frame for two states to have identical unemployment rates in a
particular month but PBDs that differ by 20 weeks or more. For example, in April of
2011, the unemployment rates in Texas and Arkansas were both 8.0 percent and pay-
roll employment was growing at just under a 3 percent pace in both states. This sug-
gests that labor market conditions that determine the job-finding prospects of
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due to different state-specific rules regarding the EB program triggers and regular UI
availability, eligible UI recipients had a PBD of 71 weeks in Arkansas and 93 weeks in
Texas. In addition, given the trigger thresholds for UI extensions discussed in Section
2.1, it is also common to observe large differences in PBD’s based only a small change
over time in a state’s unemployment rate or small differences between state unemploy-
ment rates.17 The differences in labor market conditions that trigger benefit extensions
are controlled for through the flexible polynomials in the state unemployment rate and
rate of job growth.
The main identifying assumption is that unobserved characteristics of state labor
markets that affect job search behavior and outcomes are uncorrelated with variation
over time in the availability of extended UI benefits in a state (conditional on the state
labor market conditions that trigger the extensions). These identifying assumptions are
less stringent than those used by Farber and Valletta (2013), who relied on within-state
variation created by the comparison of individual unemployment duration to maximum
available weeks of UI for each individual’s state at a point in time. My less stringent as-
sumptions are required in order to obtain direct estimates of the response of un-
employment duration to changes in available UI weeks, which in turn enables direct
comparison of my results to prior papers. However, this approach raises the possibility
that my estimates are contaminated by unobserved correlations between economic
conditions that affect search behavior and the availability of extended benefits. As
noted above, this concern is mitigated by the inclusion of detailed controls for state
labor market conditions. Examining the results for ineligible individuals provides add-
itional information regarding the potential impact of omitted variables.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Logit and multinomial logit regressions
The main estimation results for UI eligible individuals are displayed in Table 3. Four
different specifications are estimated for each sample period, with individual character-
istics, unemployment duration, and state labor market conditions added sequentially to
the baseline specification that includes only state and time dummies. Panel A shows
the impact of UI benefit extensions (PBD) in the full sample of eligible individuals,
while the second panel shows results for the same specifications but with the impact of
UI benefit extensions estimated separately for individuals who have been unemployed
for at least 26 weeks or fewer than 26 weeks (6 months).18 The estimates listed in both
panels are based on transformed logit coefficients. They represent the marginal effects
of 10 additional weeks of extended UI benefits on the probability of existing from
unemployment (expressed as proportions, like the baseline exit rates in Table 2 and
Figures 3 and 4).
For the full sample results in Panel A, the column (1) estimate for the 2007–11 sam-
ple indicates that a UI extension of 10 weeks reduces the probability of exiting un-
employment by about 1 percentage point. This estimate is halved and becomes
statistically insignificant as the complete sets of control variables are added. No signifi-
cant estimates for the overall PBD effect are found for the 2000–04 sample.
By contrast, Panel B of Table 3 shows that for both time periods the estimated nega-
tive effect of UI benefit extensions on unemployment exits is relatively robust for
Table 3 Logit regression results, Pr (Exit from unemployment), UI ELIGIBLE, marginal
effects of of 10 additional UI weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





















Panel B: Separate effects of UI weeks for unemployment duration >=or < 26 weeks
2007-11 2000-04


































State/time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual
characteristics
N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Unemployment
duration




N N N Y N N N Y
Observations 72,347 72,347 72,347 72,347 43,167 43,167 43,167 43,167
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by state). **p< 0.01, *p< 0.05.
Notes: Numbers are transformed logit coefficients, expressed as marginal effects on the probability of observing an
unemployment exit. See text for the complete list of additional controls.
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directly affected by the benefit extensions. In the 2007–11 sample, the PBD coefficient
for the long duration group is cut approximately in half by the inclusion of individual
characteristics and state labor market controls. However, it remains highly significant
in all columns. The estimate in the fourth column is significant at nearly the 1-percent
level and implies a reduction in the unemployment exit probability of about 1 percent-
age point (relative to a baseline exit rate of about 17 percent for UI eligibles un-
employed for at least 6 months; see Table 2). By contrast, for individuals who have
been unemployed for less than 6 months and hence are not directly affected by the
benefit expansions, the estimated PBD effects are small and highly insignificant in
general.19
A similar pattern across the columns of Panel B in Table 3 is evident for the 2000–04
sample, but with a larger estimated effect of benefit extensions on unemployment exits.
For this earlier sample period, column (8) shows approximately a 2 percentage point
reduction in the probability of exiting unemployment (relative to a baseline prob-
ability of about 24 percent in Table 2). Although this estimate is substantially larger
than the corresponding estimate for the 2007–11 sample (column 4), the exit rates
are also larger in the 2000–04 sample, suggesting that the impact on unemployment
duration may not differ by much. The difference between the two estimates is not
statistically significant at conventional levels (the t-statistic on the difference
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the next sub-section.
The results in Table 3 are based on the sample of 2-month forward matches that cor-
rect for potentially spurious unemployment transitions, as discussed in Section 3.1. The
Additional file 1: Table A3 lists parallel results based on the larger sample of uncor-
rected transitions. The coefficients on PBD are slightly larger and more precisely
estimated for the 2007–11 sample using the uncorrected data, but substantially smaller
and less precise in the 2000–04 sample. The findings for the 2000–04 sample illustrate
the importance of using the corrected data, which is reinforced by the magnitude
calculations discussed in the next sub-section.
Table 4 lists the results for the same specifications as Table 3, but with the
sample restricted to individuals who are not eligible to receive UI benefits.20 The
estimated effects of benefit extensions generally are small and highly insignificant,
especially in the specifications with complete controls, and they vary in sign. This
is true for the overall sample effect (Panel A) and also the effect for individuals
unemployed for at least 26 weeks (Panel B). The absence of any negative effects
of PBD on exits for this placebo sample of ineligible individuals suggests that
PBD is not serving as a proxy for unobserved, adverse economic conditions. In
conjunction with the Table 3 results for eligible individuals who have been
unemployed for less than 6 months, these results for ineligibles provide further
evidence that the effects of benefit extensions are largely restricted to individuals
who are eligible to receive them.21Table 4 Logit regression results, Pr (Exit from unemployment), UI INELIGIBLE, marginal
effects of 10 additional UI weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





















Panel B: Separate effects of UI weeks for unemployment duration >= or < 26 weeks
2007-11 2000-04

































State/time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Unemployment
duration
N N Y Y N N Y Y
State unemp. & emp.
growth (cubics)
N N N Y N N N Y
Observations 50,141 50,141 50,141 50,141 40,129 40,129 40,129 40,129
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by state). **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Notes: Numbers are transformed logit coefficients, expressed as marginal effects on the probability of observing an
unemployment exit. See text for the complete list of additional controls.
Table 5 Multinomial logit regression results, UI ELIGIBLE, separate exit routes: to
employment or not in labor force (NILF); marginal effects of 10 additional UI weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Single UI weeks variable
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Panel B: Separate effects for unemployment duration >= or < 26 weeks
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State/time Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y
Unemployment duration Y Y Y Y
Stateunemp.& emp.growth (cubics) Y Y Y Y
Observations 72,347 72,347 43,167 43,167
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by state). **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Notes: Numbers are transformed logit coefficients, expressed as marginal effects on the probability of observing an
unemployment exit. See text and Appendix Table A2 for the complete list of additional controls.
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the separate routes of employment (job finding) and out of the labor force (not in labor
force, or NILF). I rely on a multinomial logit specification, which treats the cause-
specific exit rates as independent. Consistent with Rothstein (2011) and Farber and
Valletta (2013), UI extensions lengthen unemployment spells primarily through redu-
cing labor force exits rather than job finding. For both sample periods, the only statisti-
cally significant estimates are for the PBD effect on labor force exits for individuals
unemployed for at least 26 weeks, and the magnitudes of the NILF estimates are uni-
formly much larger than the magnitudes of the job-finding estimates.22
As noted in the Introduction and literature review in Section 2.2, some past re-
search has uncovered spillover or search externality effects on ineligible individuals,
which are most likely under weak labor market conditions (Landais et al. 2010). In
particular, to the extent that benefit extensions reduce job finding by UI-eligible in-
dividuals, this may open up available jobs for UI-ineligible individuals, whose job
finding rate will rise.
Table 6 investigates the possibility of spillovers by providing regression results
similar to those in Table 4 for ineligibles, but with the dependent variable reflecting
unemployment exits through job finding only. I provide two sets of results for each
period, for the basic specification from prior tables (columns 1 and 3) and for an ex-
panded specification that includes interactions between the PBD variables and the
state unemployment rate. The basic specification implies no spillover effects of in-
creasing in benefit availability for ineligible individuals: the coefficients on PBD are
Table 6 Logit regression results, Pr (Exit to employment), UI INELIGIBLE (includes
interactions with state unemployment rate), marginal effects of 10 additional UI weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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State/time Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y
Unemployment duration Y Y Y Y
State unemp. & emp. growth (cubics) Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Observations 50,141 50,141 40,129 40,129
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by state). **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Notes: Numbers are transformed logit coefficients, expressed as marginal effects on the probability of observing an
unemployment exit to employment. See text for the complete list of additional controls.
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provides evidence for spillover effects in high unemployment states in the 2007–11
sample. The interaction effects between the PBD variables and the state unemploy-
ment rate are positive and precisely estimated, with very similar point estimates of
the PBD effect for individuals who have been unemployed for greater or less than
six months.
The implied spillover effects for ineligibles in the 2007–11 sample are limited to
states with very high unemployment rates. In particular, combining the coefficients on
PBD and its interaction with the state unemployment rate implies essentially a zero ef-
fect of PBD changes at an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent.23 This is slightly below
the weighted sample average state unemployment rate of 8.6 percent in my 2007–11
sample (as expected, given the essentially zero estimate for PBD in column 1). How-
ever, in a state with an 11 percent unemployment rate, which is around the 80th per-
centile of the weighted distribution of state unemployment rates in the 2007–11
sample, an additional 10 weeks of available UI benefits (PBD) increases job finding
rates for ineligibles by about 1 percentage point.24 This is a meaningful impact relative
to the base job finding rate of 14.3 percent in the 2007–11 sample of ineligibles
(Table 2, column 2).
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finding by ineligible individuals raise the possibility of similar interaction effects for eli-
gible individuals. I therefore estimated all of the regressions for the eligible samples
from Tables 3 and 5 with interactions between the PBD variables and the state un-
employment rate. None of the interaction coefficients approached conventional levels
of statistical significance (results available on request).
5.2 Translation to unemployment duration
The estimated coefficients for the specifications with complete controls in Table 3 sug-
gest a moderate effect of UI benefit extensions on unemployment exits for individuals
who are directly affected by the extensions. In particular, for job losers who have been
unemployed for at least 26 weeks, 10 additional weeks of UI benefits reduce unemploy-
ment exit rates by about 1–2 percentage points (relative to baseline exit rates of about
17–25 percent). In this section, I translate these estimates into effects on expected dur-
ation of unemployment, for direct comparison to past results regarding the effects of
UI benefit extensions.
Conversion of the effects on unemployment exits into effects on unemployment dur-
ation is straightforward. Let Pt = (the fraction continuing in unemployment from
month t to t+1) which is just (1-(exit rate))t. Then the expected or average duration of
a completed spell of unemployment (S) is as follows (see e.g. Sider 1985):
S ¼ 1−P1ð Þ þ 2∙P1∙ 1−P2ð Þ þ 3∙P1∙P2∙ 1−P3ð Þ þ… ð2Þ
¼ 1þ P1 þ P1∙P2 þ P1∙P2∙P3 þ…
I apply this formula to the sample of eligible individuals unemployed for at least 26weeks. For this group, I obtain expected completed duration S by setting P1 through P6
equal to 1 (to ensure spell lengths of at least 6 months) and then using the observed
empirical continuation rates to calculate P7 through P24, which are then plugged into
the formula for S above.25 This represents duration with the extensions as observed. To
assess the impact of the extensions on expected duration, I obtain a counterfactual
value of S by subtracting from P7 through P24 the estimated effects of benefit exten-
sions for individuals unemployed for at least 26 weeks in the models with complete
controls (Table 3, Panel B, columns 4 and 8) and then recalculating S. The impact of
benefit extensions on expected duration for affected individuals (job losers unemployed
for at least 6 months) is represented by the difference between the observed and coun-
terfactual values of S.
Table 7 lists the results of this calculation of expected duration in Panel A, along
with a comparison to past estimates in Panel B. The expected durations calculated
in months are converted to weeks (months*(52/12)) for direct comparability to past
estimates. My estimates indicate that the increase in expected unemployment
duration due to a 10-week extension of UI benefits is approximately 1.3 weeks in
the 2007–11 episode and a slightly larger 1.6 weeks for the 2000–04 episode. These
estimates are in the middle-to-upper end of the range of past estimates listed in
Panel B.
The corresponding estimates for expected duration based on the uncorrected transi-
tion data are only about half as large as those based on the corrected data used above.
Table 7 Effects of UI benefit extensions on unemployment duration
Panel A: Estimates for 10 Extra UI weeks based on Table 3, Panel B, columns 4 and 8
(UI Eligibles, Duration >=26 Weeks)
Expected duration (weeks) Difference (effect of 10 extra UI weeks)
Observed exits Counterfactual exits
Sample period:
2007-11 52.5 51.2 1.3
2000-04 45.3 43.7 1.6
Panel B: Estimates from past research (UI administrative data)
Paper: Cited estimate Effect scaled for 10 extra UI weeks
Moffitt (1985) Table 4: duration up 0.16 weeks
with 1-week extension
1.6
Katz and Meyer (1990) Abstract: duration up 0.16-0.20
weeks with 1-week extension
1.6-2.0
Card and Levine (2000) Abstract: duration up 1 week
with 13-week extension
0.8
Jurajda and Tannery (2003) Fn. 35: duration up 1.87 weeks
for 25-week extension
0.7
Notes: Panel A based on estimated effects of 10 additional weeks of UI benefits on unemployment exits, from Table 3,
Panel B, columns 4 (2007–11) and 8 (2000–04). See text for method.
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expected unemployment duration due to a 10-week extension of UI benefits is approxi-
mately 0.7 weeks in the 2007–11 episode and 0.9 weeks for the 2000–04 episode. This
is consistent with the shorter overall durations implied by the uncorrected transitions
data (Figure 2).
On balance, my results indicate a moderate effect of UI benefit extensions on un-
employment duration in the recent episode. As noted in Section 2.1, in 2009 the poten-
tial duration of UI benefits reached about 96 weeks for the typical eligible individual.
This implies an overall extension of about 70 weeks. Applying the method of Table 5,
Panel A to a 70-week extension indicates that the recent extensions increased un-
employment duration by about 7.3 weeks (16 percent) for job losers unemployed for at
least 6 months.6 Conclusions
I used U.S. labor market survey (CPS) data to estimate the impact of variation in
the potential duration of UI benefits arising from benefit extensions that differed
across states and over time. I compared the effects from the recent unprecedented
extension episode (beginning in 2008) with the earlier, more limited episode from
the early 2000s. I focused on the group most likely to be affected by the benefit ex-
tensions—job losers unemployed for at least 6 months. The estimated effect of a
specific benefit extension on unemployment duration is nearly identical across the
two episodes. These estimates suggest that 10 additional weeks of benefits increase
unemployment duration by about 1.5 weeks, which is in the middle-to-upper end of
the range of past estimates based on U.S. administrative data.26 In addition, the esti-
mated effects of benefit duration within each period do not vary based on the state
unemployment rate.
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is consistent with other recent research (e.g., Schmieder et al. 2012), although it con-
trasts with the findings of Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011). This likely reflects differences
in specific elements of our respective empirical designs, for example Kroft and Notowi-
digdo’s focus on benefit generosity rather than benefit duration. On the other hand, I
uncovered evidence suggesting substantial spillover effects to individuals who are ineli-
gible to receive UI benefits, for whom I find higher job finding rates during the recent
extension episode in states with very high unemployment rates. I also found, however,
that the effects of benefit extensions on unemployment transitions and duration for eli-
gible individuals arise primarily through extended labor force attachment rather than
reduced job finding. As such, the source of the spillovers to ineligible individuals is un-
clear: their increased job finding in response to increases in benefit availability in high
unemployment states should be matched by reduced job finding for eligible individuals.
Further investigation of potential spillovers using alternative, more precise data sources
would be useful.
One open question is the optimality of the unprecedented UI benefit extensions that
occurred during the Great Recession and its aftermath in the United States. My finding
of little or no impact of the extensions on job finding is relevant in this regard, suggest-
ing that the adverse moral hazard effect of UI on job search is greatly outweighed by
the favorable liquidity and social insurance effects (Chetty 2008, Card et al. 2007).
Moreover, as Schmieder et al. (2012) argue, the socially optimal duration of UI benefits
varies with the inverse of the ratio between the effects of UI extensions on nonemploy-
ment duration and the duration of UI benefit recipiency. Given my estimate of a
limited impact of extended UI on job finding combined with very high take-up rates
for extended UI benefits in recent years, it is likely that optimal UI benefit duration
was quite long during the Great Recession and its aftermath. This is an important area
for future research.
Endnotes
1Additional program details are provided in periodic reports issued by the U.S. Con-
gressional Research Service, notably Lake (2003), Whittaker and Isaacs (2012), and
Isaacs (2013).
2The IUR is the three-month average ratio of persons receiving UI benefits to the
number of persons covered by the UI system. The TUR is a three-month average of the
unemployment rate published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
3The weekly “trigger” notices for the EB program back to 2002 and the complete
EUC program are available online at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/trigger/ and
http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc_trigger/. Similar trigger date information for
the TEUC program is no longer available online but was kindly provided to me by Scott
Gibbons of the U.S. Department of Labor.
4Figure 1 does not reflect several temporary suspensions of the EUC program
arising from legislative disagreements that occurred in April, June-July, and Decem-
ber of 2010. During those periods, reauthorization was expected and individuals
were allowed to receive benefits through their current EUC tier and retroactive
benefits for the next tier after reauthorization. It is therefore likely that the suspen-
sion periods did not significantly offset any behavioral responses to the overall
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/18extension programs. The suspension periods are largely addressed in the empirical ana-
lysis through the use of complete monthly date dummies in my econometric equations.
5In 2011–13, eight states passed legislation that reduced their normal UI duration
below 26 weeks. As an extreme example, in July 2013 North Carolina implemented
new legislation that reduced normal UI duration to 19 weeks based on a formula tied
to the prevailing state unemployment rate. This and related changes in their state UI
laws caused the state to lose eligibility for the federal extensions, reducing total avail-
able UI weeks to 19, as reflected in the minimum weeks plot near the end of the sam-
ple frame in Panel A of Figure 1. Reductions in normal UI weeks translate into
reduction in available weeks through the EUC and EB programs (see Isaacs 2012). I ac-
count for these changes in my database of available UI weeks.
6In addition, selected recent work has focused on direct measures of search activity
using high-frequency survey or online data from periods corresponding to the recent
benefit extensions (Krueger and Mueller 2011, Marinescu 2013). The results from
these papers regarding UI extension effects on search intensity and job finding are
mixed.
7The choice of the 2011 end date is described in Section 2.1.
8Rare exceptions to this exact timing can occur, such as during temporary shutdowns
of the U.S. federal government (the most recent were during 1995 and late 2013, which
are outside my sample frame).
9The survivor curves are calculated based on the complete set of available observa-
tions, which is larger for the uncorrected transitions due to fewer restrictions placed on
the underlying matched sample.
10The share of unemployment spells lasting at least six months in the CPS cross-
section data is around 30 percent during 2007–11. The discrepancy between the im-
plied durations for my sampled spells and the CPS cross-section is largely due to the
impact of flow-based versus stock-based sampling. Simulations provided in Farber and
Valletta (2013) show that the empirical flow-based and stock-based duration distribu-
tions largely converge in steady state.
11Attrition arises in these data because the CPS survey does not track households or
individuals who move from their surveyed address. The comparison of the first and
second rows in Table 1 (“Currently unemployed” and “Valid matches”) illustrates the
combined impact of attrition, nonresponse, and the matching validation screen based
on demographic characteristics. The implied monthly non-match rate is about 9 per-
cent: matching is feasible for 75 percent (three-fourths) of the sample based on the
four-month rotation group structure, but the observation counts in the second row are
only about 66 percent of those in the first row on average. Past research reports little
or no impact of attrition on longitudinal estimates from matched CPS files (see
Neumark and Kawaguchi 2004 for discussion). Moreover, Rothstein (2011, page 162)
reports no conditional correlation between the 2008–11 UI extensions and CPS
matched sample attrition.
12The U.S. unemployment rate averaged 7.6 percent during 2007–11, with a peak of
10.0 percent in October 2009. By contrast, it averaged 5.2 percent during 2000–04, with
a peak of 6.3 percent in June 2003.
13Among the sample of ineligibles in both periods, about 60 percent are re-entrants,
15–20 percent are new entrants, and 20–25 percent are job leavers (quits).
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/1814Industry of prior employment is not defined for new labor force entrants; the in-
dustry tabulations in the Additional file 1 are restricted to job leavers and re-entrants.
15As noted earlier, the date dummies largely account for the potential effects of tem-
porary suspensions of extended benefit (EUC) availability in 2010.
16See the Additional file 1: Table A2 for the complete list and corresponding regres-
sion results (except the industry categories).
17This variation raises the possibility of a regression discontinuity (RD) design for
the empirical analysis, in which the pattern of unemployment transitions is com-
pared across individuals in states that are on either side of an unemployment
threshold that triggers additional UI extension weeks. Marinescu (2013) implemented
an RD strategy using data from online job searches. With my matched CPS data,
this strategy would produce observation counts that are too small to yield adequate
statistical precision.
18Complete coefficient estimates for the column (4) and (8) specifications for eligibles
(Table 3) and ineligibles (Table 4) are listed in the Additional file 1: Table A2 (excluding
the coefficients on the industry, state, and time dummies).
19Job losers unemployed for less than six months are not eligible for extended bene-
fits and hence are not directly affected by the expansions. However, their search inten-
sity may be affected by the expectation of eventual eligibility for extended benefits,
implying that they are probably not an appropriate placebo or control group for asses-
sing the effects of extended benefits. The uniformly negative coefficients for this group
in Panel B of Table 3 are consistent with this interpretation, although the effects are
not precisely estimated.
20Industry of prior employment is not defined for new labor force entrants and there-
fore is excluded from the regressions for the ineligible sample. Results for the eligible
sample are nearly identical to those listed in Table 3 when industry controls are ex-
cluded from those regressions.
21Additional file 1: Table A4 lists parallel results based on the uncorrected transitions.
This table shows a mixture of positive and negative coefficients, many of them statisti-
cally significant, with different signs across the two sample periods. This pattern likely
reflects the unreliability of uncorrected transitions for the ineligible group, which is
dominated by labor force entrants, and it precludes reliable inferences.
22Similar multinomial logit regressions for the sample of ineligibles produced PBD
coefficients that were highly insignificant in all cases.
23The calculation yielding a 7.8 percent unemployment rate is the ratio of the PBD
and PBD*state unemp. rate coefficients from Panel A: 0.0262/.00334=7.84.
24The calculation combining the two coefficients is as follows: −0.0262+11*(.00334)=
0.0105.
25I truncate durations at 24 months because very few spells are observed beyond that
point in my data; accounting for the small number of longer spells does not have a
meaningful impact on expected duration.
26Rothstein (2011) and Farber and Valletta (2013) translate their estimates into an im-
pact on the overall unemployment rate. For the recent extension period (2008 forward),
they find only a modest impact on the unemployment rate, on the order of 0.5 percent-
age points or less. Based on rough calculations, my estimated PBD responses imply a
similar modest effect on the unemployment rate.
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: Supplemental results. Table A1. Descriptive statistics, analysis samples (continued from text
Table 2). Table A2. Logit regression results, Pr (Exit from unemployment), complete specification, UI eligibles and
ineligibles (Panel B of Tables 3–4, columns 4 and 8). Table A3. Logit regression results, Pr (Exit from unemployment),
UI ELIGIBLE 1-MONTH TRANSITIONS (UNCORRECTED), marginal effects of 10 additional UI weeks. Table A4. Logit
regression results, Pr (Exit from unemployment), UI INELIGIBLE, 1-MONTH TRANSITIONS (UNCORRECTED), marginal
effects of 10 additional UI weeks.
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